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Fiona Hayes-Renshaw (Brussels)
From Procedural Chore to Political Prestige:
Historic Development and Recent Reforms of
the Presidency of the Council
Die Ratspräsidentschaft wurden in den 1950er Jahren als administrative Pflicht auf der Basis strikter
Gleichheit zwischen den damals zehn Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften eingeführt. Heute
stellt es ein Amt von hohem politischen Prestige dar, das in einer tieferen und weiteren Union wichtige
Rechte und Verantwortlichkeiten mit sich bringt, auch wenn viele davon sowohl formell als auch informell
beschränkt sind. Dieser Beitrag verfolgt die Veränderungen, die das Amt im Lauf der Zeit erfahren hat,
als Folge unter anderem einer Schwächung der Kommission, der zunehmenden Rolle des Europäischen
Rates, Änderungen der Abstimmungsregeln, Abweichungen von der sog. Gemeinschaftsmethode,
Erweiterungen und neuen Regeln der Transparenz. Die historische Entwicklung und jüngste Reformen
des Amtes werden nachgezeichnet, indem dessen vier zentrale Funktionen (Administration und
Koordination, das Setzen politischer Prioritäten, Mediation sowie interne und externe Repräsentation)
und die Organisation der Präsidentschaft sowohl aus der Perspektive der EU insgesamt als auch aus der
Perspektive des den Vorsitz innehabenden Mitglieds untersucht werden. Die vordringliche Beschäftigung
jüngerer Präsidentschaften mit den Themen Öffentlichkeit und Information mag als Versuch gewertet
werden, es der Öffentlichkeit zu erleichtern, eine Präsidentschaft von der anderen zu unterscheiden.
Keywords: EU Council, European Council, Presidency, Council Secretariat
Rat der Europäischen Union, Europäischer Rat, Ratspräsidentschaft, Generalsekretariat
des Rates
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (ÖZP), 36 Jg. (2007) H. 2,  107–123
1. Introduction
On the first of January and the first of July
every year, a different member state takes over
the presidency of the Council of the European
Union (EU). The job includes presiding over
the Council’s 300 or so largely invisible pre-
paratory bodies and the very high-profile meet-
ings of the heads of state or government in the
European Council. In national and international
media, the Council presidency is frequently and
erroneously described as the ‘presidency of the
EU’, simultaneously revealing a lack of under-
standing of the EU’s institutional system and
the perceived importance of the Council within
it. This article traces the historic development
and recent reforms of the office of the Council
presidency from its inception in 1951 in the
context of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC). Successive treaties, reports,
European Council conclusions and versions of
the Council’s internal rules of procedure (CRPs)
can be used to trace the development of the of-
fice of the presidency but, as with so much else
in the EU, codification has frequently tended to
follow rather than to establish a particular prac-
tice.
This article is divided into two main parts.
In the first and longer part, we identify the four
main functions of the Council presidency today,
contrast them with the functions originally en-
visaged for the office and explain how they de-
veloped over time. Part two deals with the or-
ganisation of the presidency, both from the point
of view of the EU as a whole and from the per-
spective of the member state in the chair. In a
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short concluding section, we identify the main
factors underlying the metamorphosis of the
office of the Council presidency over time and
the effect on it of recent reforms.
2. Functions
The institutional architects of the European
Communities (EC) focused most of their atten-
tion on the High Authority, the innovative
supranational body that later became the Com-
mission. The Special Council of Ministers (as
the 1951 Treaty establishing the ECSC named
it) was only added to the institutional structure
on the insistence of the Dutch, who were anx-
ious to provide for an intergovernmental coun-
ter-balance to the powerful High Authority, an
unknown and untested quantity at that time. The
Council’s chief task in the ECSC was ‘to har-
monise the action of the High Authority and that
of the Governments’ (Article 26 ECSC) and the
High Authority and the Council were required
to exchange information with and consult one
another. Clearly, meetings of the Council would
have to take place in order to fulfil these tasks,
and someone would have to chair them. It was
therefore decided that this chore should be
shared equally among the member states for a
period of three months at a time.
When the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom) were created six years later,
the same basic institutional design was retained
but the functions of the Council (no longer
deemed ‘Special’) now included the power to
take decisions. At the same time, the term in
office of the presidency was extended to six
months, a hint that the role of president of the
Council was no longer viewed as merely a nec-
essary duty to be fulfilled. Five decades later,
the full list of presidency functions and duties
is long and detailed, but they can be reduced to
four essential tasks: administration and coordi-
nation; the setting of political priorities; media-
tion; and internal and external representation
(Elgström 2003a, 4-7). We now look at each of
them in turn and in some detail.
2.1. Administration and coordination
The main requirement of the Council presi-
dency is to create the conditions that make de-
cision-making among its members possible.
Effective administration and coordination of the
Council’s work are key to the achievement of
this goal. Essentially, the presidency as origi-
nally envisaged was expected to convene, chair
and produce documents for Council sessions
(and, by extension, any meetings held to pre-
pare them) and this remains the core of the presi-
dency’s task today.
2.1.1. Convening meetings
The presidency is responsible for conven-
ing all meetings held within the Council hierar-
chy, either on its own initiative or at the request
of the Commission or one of the member states
(Article 1, CRPs). In the early 1950s, this en-
tailed the not very onerous task of setting dates
and booking rooms and facilities for a small
number of meetings of the foreign ministers of
the member states, and for the Coordination
Committee of senior national officials that pre-
pared the ministers’ meetings. The situation to-
day is very different. As the scope of action of
the European Communities (EC) and later the
EU expanded, other ministers were drawn into
the European-level discussions, the Council
began to meet in different configurations, and
the number of preparatory bodies increased
exponentially. Today, a typical presidency con-
venes about 40 formal Council meetings and
some 2000 meetings of preparatory bodies. Most
of these meetings take place in the Council’s
headquarters in Brussels (the so-called Justus
Lipsius building), the home of the Council Sec-
retariat, which assists the presidency in the ful-
filment of its duties (see later section). During
the months of April, June and October, the
Council’s meetings are held in Luxembourg in
accordance with a political agreement dating
back to the early years of the EC.
Four other main developments have added
to the presidency’s administrative workload as
regards the organisation of meetings. First, with
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the official inauguration of the intergovernmen-
tal European Council in 1974, the presidency
acquired the task of convening these high-pro-
file gatherings of the heads of state or govern-
ment, who meet at least twice during every presi-
dency. Until 2003, these meetings were usually
held in the country of the presidency, providing
a handy means of differentiating the various
summits (Corfu in June 1994, Turin in March
1996, Gothenburg in June 2001, and so on).
Since 2003, all formal sessions of the European
Council have taken place in Brussels, although
informal sessions may be organised in the presi-
dency member state (for example, the Hamp-
ton Court summit in October 2005 under the
UK presidency, and the Berlin summit in March
2007 under the German presidency).
Second, the practice of organising informal
Council meetings (which have no papers, no
minutes and take no official decisions) in the
presidency member state has become a regular
feature of every presidency, so much so that an
attempt has been made to limit their number.
An internal Council note of 1989 requested the
member states to reduce them to seven per presi-
dency but, despite frequent reminders from the
Legal Service of the Council Secretariat, this
rule has largely been ignored by incoming presi-
dencies. (The Germans scheduled fourteen such
meetings for their presidency in the first half of
2007.) Informal Councils are popular with mem-
ber state representatives because of the oppor-
tunities they provide to showcase the territory
and national products of the presidency mem-
ber state, and because they allow for frank ex-
changes of views and information on issues of
mutual interest or shared concern that may fa-
cilitate agreement in subsequent formal sessions.
Third, the introduction of new decision-mak-
ing procedures in the EU has had the direct re-
sult of making inter-institutional relations much
more time-consuming because they necessitate
a greater number of formal and informal meet-
ings. This is particularly true as regards the
Council’s relations with the European Parlia-
ment (EP), in which the Council presidency
speaks and acts on behalf of its Council col-
leagues (see the section below on representa-
tion). Suffice it here to say that the presidency
has to work closely with officials from the Com-
mission and the EP in order to find spaces in an
already busy schedule for its ministers and offi-
cials to attend regular meetings with their coun-
terparts from the other institutions, in order to
ensure that the Council fulfils its duties effi-
ciently within the legislative process.
Fourth, as a direct result of both the expan-
sion of the external relations of the EC/EU and
also the presidency’s acquired role as the repre-
sentative of and spokesperson for the Council,
presidency ministers and prime ministers now
also have to make time in their schedules for
meetings with the representatives of third coun-
tries and international organisations (see later
section). Here we merely need to note that hold-
ing the presidency now entails a major time com-
mitment on the part of ministers and prime min-
isters as regards external relations as well as
internal ones.
2.1.2. Chairing meetings
For every meeting it convenes, the presi-
dency member state is required to provide some-
one to chair it. In essence, this involves open-
ing the meeting, getting approval for the draft
agenda and the draft minutes of any previous
meetings, moving through each of the agenda
items in turn, giving the floor to those who in-
dicate they wish to speak, calling for and re-
cording votes when necessary, summing up the
discussion on each point and closing the meet-
ing at the end. In the early days of the EC, the
number of participants was small, the amount
of issues to be discussed was limited, and agree-
ment was reached on the basis of unanimity.
Today, with increased numbers around the ta-
ble as a result of successive enlargements, more
agenda items because of extensions in the scope
of the EU’s and therefore the Council’s activi-
ties, and many more items being subject to ma-
jority voting rules rather than unanimity, the role
of chairman has taken on added importance and
requires additional skills.
It is important not to view the early years of
the EC through rose-tinted spectacles, however,
2007_02_1-hayes.p65 31.05.2007, 14:11109
110 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw
assuming that smaller numbers and fewer issues
must have meant less conflict. After all, the
Luxembourg crisis of 1965-66 occurred under
just such numerical conditions, but the issues to
be decided upon were so deeply divisive that
they required a considerable amount of time and
diplomatic effort to be resolved.1  Nonetheless,
today’s Council presidents must fulfil a funda-
mentally different role to that of their predeces-
sors, and have been obliged to take on an in-
creased managerial role, in the fulfilment of
which they are ably assisted by the Council Sec-
retariat (see later section). In order to do their
job well, presidents need to understand EU busi-
ness and processes, to have good language skills
and to have negotiating experience. These have
always been requisite skills for a Council presi-
dent, but are arguably even more necessary to-
day because of the increased complexity of Eu-
ropean-level decision-making.
Since the late 1990s, the Council has been
engaged in a process of self-examination and
internal reform, spurred on by first the prospect
and then the reality of greatly increased num-
bers. The aim was to augment the efficiency of
the enlarged Council, and a number of reforms
were agreed at the Seville European Council in
June 2002 and later included in the Council’s
internal rules of procedure. Thus, Article 20
(The Presidency and the businesslike conduct
of discussions) and Annex V (Working meth-
ods for an enlarged Council) of the CRPs now
lay down in some detail the various means open
to the presidency in order to expedite business
within the Council.
Changes in voting rules have also had an
impact on the role of the chairman throughout
the Council hierarchy, even though explicit vot-
ing can only take place at ministerial level. On
paper, seventy per cent of all Council decisions
are now subject to qualified majority voting, but
in the decade up to 2004 only about one in five
of these was actually put to the vote (Hayes-
Renshaw/Wallace 2006a), and the early indica-
tions in the enlarged EU were that this pattern
was continuing (Hagemann/De Clerck-Sachsse
2007, 3). There is therefore a basic consensual
reflex within the Council hierarchy, whichever
decision rule applies to the issue under discus-
sion. Larger numbers and broader preferences
make the achievement of consensus dependent
on mediation, and the chairman has been ex-
pected to add this function to his or her reper-
toire (see later section). In those cases where a
vote will be called, an effective president must
be aware of the formation of qualified majori-
ties or blocking minorities and must have a strat-
egy for dealing with them. Here, too, the presi-
dency can usually count on the input and in-
sight of experienced officials from the Council
Secretariat (see later section).
Because the chairman is expected to be neu-
tral, the member state holding the presidency
must also send another (usually more junior)
delegate to the same meeting to present and de-
fend the national position. In the early days of
the EC, when the number of issue areas and
meetings was small, this caused little difficulty,
even for a member state with limited numbers
of personnel like Luxembourg, which could al-
ways call on its Benelux partners for assistance
if necessary. As time has gone on, however, and
the number of meetings has increased (today,
there may be anything up to 20 meetings taking
place on any one day in Justus Lipsius), even
the largest member states have had to hire extra
staff for their presidency period in order to en-
sure adequate representation at all meetings.
There are some exceptions to the general rule
that the presidency member state provides the
chair for all meetings held within the Council
hierarchy:
– The powerful Economic and Financial Com-
mittee (EFC), which prepares the work of
Ecofin, the Economic and Financial Affairs
Council, has an elected president, who is
chosen from among the members of the com-
mittee for a renewable period of two years.
– Member states that have opted-out of cer-
tain policy areas may cede the chair to the
next opted-in member state when such is-
sues are discussed or voted upon during their
term in office. So, for example, during the
Danish presidency in the second half of
2002, discussions relating to the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) were
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chaired by a representative of the succeed-
ing presidency member state, Greece, be-
cause of Denmark’s treaty-based opt-out
concerning the ESDP.
– In other groupings, such as the informal Euro
Group, which brings together the finance
ministers of the member states belonging to
the Euro zone, the presidency rotates among
those member states alone.
– Some minor working parties are chaired by
officials from the Council Secretariat.
In addition, the Council’s rules of procedure
(available on the Council’s website)2  provide
for a number of further exceptions:
– The Council may decide that the chairman-
ship of any of the committees provided for
in the Treaties (with the exception of
Coreper, the prestigious Committee of Per-
manent Representatives, which prepares the
work of the Council) should be exercised
by a delegate from a member state other than
that currently holding the Council presi-
dency. Coreper may take a similar decision
regarding the committees and working par-
ties it has set up (Article 19.4). I am not
aware of any examples of such decisions,
presumably included as a safeguard against
a potential future eventuality.
– The current presidency may cede the chair
of preparatory bodies other than Coreper to
the representative of the next presidency for
the preparation of Councils held only once
every six months, and scheduled for a date
early in the next presidency (Article 19.5).
To take a hypothetical example: The only
meeting of the Education, Youth and Cul-
ture Council under presidency B is sched-
uled for the beginning of February, but the
preparatory discussions for the meeting take
place at working party level in October and
November under presidency A. In acknowl-
edgement of the agenda-setting and broker-
age powers of the presidency, these meet-
ings may be chaired by the delegate from
member state B, which will exercise the
presidency when the Council meeting takes
place, and will be responsible for getting
agreement on the issues being discussed.
– When a dossier is likely to be dealt with es-
sentially during a specific six-month period,
preparatory meetings discussing the dossier
held during the preceding six-month period
may be chaired by a delegate from the suc-
ceeding presidency (Article 19.6). To take
another hypothetical example: The budget
is essentially decided upon in the second half
of the year, when presidency B is in charge.
If any preparatory discussions take place
towards the end of the first half of the year,
during presidency A, the two member states
may decide that a delegate from member
state B will chair those parts of any prepara-
tory meetings where discussions on the dos-
sier take place. Once again, this is an ac-
knowledgement of the agenda-setting and
brokerage powers of the presidency.
Another recent development as regards the
chairing of meetings arises from the implemen-
tation of new transparency rules first agreed in
1992 and gradually strengthened in the inter-
vening years. Presidency ministers must now
be prepared for some parts of the Council meet-
ings they chair to be televised, and made avail-
able to the public.3  This is achieved either by
means of closed circuit television in a special
room in the Council’s press centre (the Council
chamber itself remaining strictly off-limits) or
by means of video streaming in all the official
languages on the Council’s website.4  For some
Council insiders, this development is nothing
short of revolutionary, given the Council’s en-
trenched habit of meeting behind closed doors
and refusing, until the late 1990s, to allow the
systematic release of the minutes or voting
records of its deliberations. For others, it is a
long overdue and most welcome advance, a
means of reversing the Council’s long-standing
reputation for excessive secrecy. For the person
in the chair, however, who may have to deal with
national delegates playing to their respective
domestic audiences, the prospect of such pub-
lic scrutiny can be daunting.
Interested outsiders can now watch the min-
isters engaged in four different types of discus-
sion: first, all Council deliberations and votes
on issues subject to the co-decision procedure;
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second, the Council’s initial deliberations on
important legislative acts adopted by procedures
other than co-decision; third, public debates on
important issues affecting the interests of the
Union and its citizens; and fourth, policy de-
bates on the Council’s programmes. The dates
and times of these open sessions are determined
in advance and advertised on the Council’s
website. Article 8 of the Council’s rules of pro-
cedure requires that a recorded version of such
sessions be available on the Council’s website
for at least one month after their initial broad-
cast.
2.1.3. Producing documents
The presidency’s task of producing docu-
ments begins even before it enters into office in
the wake of recent reforms designed to increase
coherence and continuity between successive
presidency periods. Since the late 1980s, incom-
ing presidencies have been expected – and in-
deed have welcomed the opportunity - to indi-
cate in advance what they hope to achieve dur-
ing their time in the chair. High-profile speeches
by the prime minister or foreign minister, ad-
dresses to the plenary session of the European
Parliament or even articles in leading newspa-
pers or journals, have been variously utilised to
gain advance publicity for the priorities and as-
pirations of the incoming team.
The system of rotating presidencies carries
with it the risk of having new priorities imposed
on the EU every six months, and indeed the EU
has suffered from such instances in the past, and
the lack of consistency and coherence they
caused. It was therefore decided at the Seville
European Council of June 2002 that the work
of the Council should be programmed on a
multi-annual basis, spanning several presiden-
cies. The Seville reforms required a series of
inter-linked documents: first, a three-year stra-
tegic programme drawn up by the six member
states holding the presidency over that period;
second, annual operational programmes agreed
by the two member states taking on the presi-
dency in the same calendar year; and third, in-
dividual work programmes submitted by each
incoming presidency, covering their specific
period in office. This system proved too cum-
bersome however and, once the decision had
been taken to introduce an embryonic form of
team presidency in the wake of the 2007 en-
largement, the programming requirements for
incoming presidencies were lightened some-
what.
The core document, from which all the oth-
ers flow, is now the draft programme of Coun-
cil activities, which spans 18 months (Article
2.4 CRPs). It is drawn up jointly by the three
member states scheduled to hold office over that
period, in close cooperation with the Commis-
sion and after ‘appropriate consultations’, no-
tably with the EP. The first such programme,
drawn up by Germany, Portugal and Slovenia,
was duly endorsed by the General Affairs and
External Relations Council (GAERC) in De-
cember 2006. On the basis of the 18-month pro-
gramme and once again in consultation with the
Commission, each incoming presidency is then
required to submit an individual work pro-
gramme, indicating its priorities for its term in
office (see below) and including a schedule of
the main Council and other meetings it intends
to convene. Finally, shortly before it takes of-
fice, each incoming presidency establishes in-
dicative provisional agendas for each Council
meeting scheduled for the next six months,
showing the legislative work and operational
decisions envisaged (Article 2.5 CRPs).
In advance of every meeting it convenes
within the Council hierarchy, the presidency
circulates a provisional agenda to the other
member states and the Commission. Following
the implementation over the past decade of new
rules on public access to documents, these agen-
das (and the minutes of Council meetings drawn
up by the Council Secretariat) are now normally
available to the general public either directly via
the Council’s website or by application to the
Public Information Unit in the Council Secre-
tariat.
One other important set of documents drawn
up by the presidency are the conclusions of the
discussions which take place in the European
Council. In many ways, these meetings of the
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heads of state or government have become the
focal point of every presidency, particularly the
‘wrap-up’ sessions that take place in the final
month of every presidency (June and Decem-
ber). Consequently, their conclusions are exam-
ined closely for clues as to the level of agree-
ment (or disagreement) between the member
states and the state of integration within the EU.
Although the results of discussions in the Euro-
pean Council are made public as the Conclu-
sions of the Presidency, and presented as such
by the presidency at a press conference as soon
as the European Council ends, there is usually
extensive input from Coreper, the Commission
and the Council Secretariat, and the conclusions
are endorsed by each of the heads of state or
government before being released.
2.1.4. Coordination
The Council of Ministers today sits at the
very centre of the EU’s legislative and decision-
making processes. It is a much more complex
body than its forerunner in the ECSC or even
the EC, and is part of an increasingly intricate
system of inter-institutional networks and inter-
governmental relationships. Originally, the task
of coordinating the Council’s work was granted
to the foreign ministers, but as the number of
Council configurations and participants in-
creased, they proved unable or unwilling to ful-
fil this function (see Gomez/Peterson 2001).
Today the task is shared between the Council
Secretariat, the General Affairs Council, the
European Council and the presidency.
An incoming and incumbent presidency is
required to fulfil a number of different types of
coordination at different levels. The first is do-
mestic coordination, a necessary requirement for
all member states, if they are to present a coher-
ent national position within the Council, but
doubly important for the presidency member
state because of its extra coordinating responsi-
bilities. Coordination begins at home, and an
incoming presidency member state whose do-
mestic coordination is badly organised or inef-
fective will be viewed with some apprehension
by its EU colleagues. Thus, every incoming
presidency first reviews, and if necessary adapts,
its domestic systems of coordination, and then
decides how to deal with the additional layers
and levels of coordination that the exercise of
the presidency will demand. The Brussels-based
national permanent representation usually plays
a key role in this regard, becoming the fulcrum
of activity in the run-up to and during the presi-
dency itself (see later section).
Second, coordination must be ensured within
and between the various layers serving each
Council configuration, in order to ensure that
dossiers move smoothly up (and if necessary
down) the various decision-making levels in an
efficient manner. This vertical coordination will
usually encompass one or more working par-
ties, Coreper or another senior preparatory com-
mittee, the relevant Council and in some cases
the European Council. The individuals chair-
ing each of these bodies need to keep one an-
other closely informed about the progress of
negotiations on specific dossiers at their level,
and together plan the movement of dossiers be-
tween them. They are assisted in this task by
officials from the Council Secretariat, who brief
the presidency in advance of meetings and pro-
duce notes of the discussions afterwards. Coor-
dination within each of the levels of the Coun-
cil hierarchy is hugely time-consuming today,
not only because of the large number of actors
now involved, but also because of the ingrained
habit throughout the Council hierarchy of reach-
ing most agreements by consensus, whatever the
voting rule.
Third, horizontal coordination between the
different Council configurations has become
both more difficult and more necessary as the
number of Council configurations has increased
in response to successive extensions to the scope
of EC/EU and therefore Council activity. At one
stage in the early 1990s, the Council met in 22
different configurations, although they did not
all meet with the same frequency or intensity
(see Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace 2006b, 38-9).
Since 2004, these have been reduced to nine,
mainly by fusing some previously separate con-
figurations. In practice, fused Council meetings
often consist of a sequence of several distinct
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sessions, each dealing with a specific sector and
attended by different ministers and delegations.
Fourth, in its capacity as the spokesperson
of the Council, the presidency is obliged to work
closely with representatives of the Commission
and the European Parliament in the context of
the budgetary and the various legislative pro-
cedures. Representatives of different levels of
these three institutions meet regularly in tria-
logues to discuss and coordinate their work on
current dossiers and to try to find compromises
that will speed up the decision-making process.
First introduced in the context of the concilia-
tion procedure, these trialogues have now been
extended to all stages of the co-decision
procedure, with positive results in terms of first
and second reading agreements and fewer for-
mal conciliation processes (Corbett et al. 2005,
220).
Finally, in order to ensure as seamless a
handover as possible, the presidency has always
been expected to coordinate its work with the
presidencies immediately preceding and suc-
ceeding it. In recent years, as we have seen, this
has been extended to include the drafting of a
common programme covering several presiden-
cies. The introduction of an embryonic form of
team presidencies in 2007 was expected to give
rise to even greater cooperation and coordina-
tion between the member states grouped in each
trio, but it remains to be seen how deep this will
turn out to be in practice.
2.2. Setting political priorities
A new Council presidency means change.
The faces at the head of the table are different,
the administrative style may change for better
or worse and certain issues may move to posi-
tions of greater or lesser prominence on the
Council’s agenda. The presidency programme,
presented in advance of the presidency start date,
indicates the areas where the presidency hopes
or expects to make headway during its time in
the chair. As the leader of the Council, the con-
venor of its meetings and the draftsman of its
agendas, the presidency is assumed to be capa-
ble of determining the political priorities of the
Council during its term in office. This notion,
while true in theory and based on a certain de-
gree of historical experience, is less well-
founded today.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, it was the High
Authority (Commission) that set the political
priorities of the EC, thereby essentially setting
the Council’s agenda and predetermining what
each presidency would have to deal with dur-
ing its term in office. Following the Luxembourg
crisis of 1965-6, however, the Commission was
informally required to consult the member gov-
ernments before presenting proposals to the
Council, thereby de facto if not de jure relin-
quishing its exclusive right of initiative and cre-
ating a political vacuum. At the same time, the
EC’s scope of activity expanded and the Coun-
cil began to meet in different configurations.
Their work had to be coordinated and decisions
had to be taken about the relative merits and
importance of competing policy priorities.
As the designated leader of the Council, the
presidency seemed the obvious body to whom
to devolve these new responsibilities. The presi-
dency’s duties were further augmented in the
1970s following the inauguration of the deter-
minedly intergovernmental system of European
Political Cooperation (EPC) and the formal es-
tablishment of the European Council, which was
also expected to play a role in the setting of the
EU’s political priorities. The central role of the
presidency as regards setting political priorities
was reinforced once again in the 1990s with the
introduction of both the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) as policy areas not subject to the
normal ‘Community method’ and therefore de-
noting a minor role for the Commission.
All through this period, the EC and then the
EU continued to extend its membership on sev-
eral occasions, with the result that new and dif-
ferent political priorities were regularly added
to the mix, and had to compete for attention.
The Council presidency began to be viewed as
a real locus of power, and it became common-
place for member states to try to use their time
in the chair to advance particular national inter-
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ests. Incoming presidencies therefore invested
much time and energy in drawing up their ad-
vance programmes, and tried where possible to
align the EC/EU’s political priorities with their
own during their term in office.
Every presidency programme is made up of
two main categories of items. The first category
consists of inherited issues, that is, those already
on the table because they are part of a rolling
programme, because they have been left over
from the previous presidency or because their
agreement is subject to a time limit due to ex-
pire during the incoming presidency period. The
second category contains issues of particular
interest to the presidency member state, whether
for geographical, economic or political reasons,
and on which it hopes to advance agreement
during its time in the chair. If the presidency
member state is lucky (or extremely well organ-
ised), the first and second categories may over-
lap. Thus, the Finns officially launched a cam-
paign in 1997 to promote a so-called ‘Northern
Dimension’ in the EU’s external relations (es-
sentially, a new relationship with Russia) that
was orchestrated precisely to come to fruition
(as it eventually did) in the form of a ministerial
conference during its presidency in the second
half of 1999 (see Tallberg 2006, 90-101).
A third category of items, for which plan-
ning is impossible, should also be mentioned.
These are unexpected events that occur during
the presidency and to which it is obliged to re-
act, sometimes to the detriment of the rest of its
carefully planned programme. All incoming
presidencies expect the unexpected and hope
they will be able to deal with it efficiently when
it occurs, but the German presidency in the first
half of 1999 had more than its fair share of un-
expected events with which to contend: the
deepening of the war in Kosovo, the NATO
bombing of Serbian targets and the resignation
of the Santer Commission.
Tallberg (2003, 21-30) has distinguished
between three different ways open to the presi-
dency of influencing the Council’s policy
agenda: agenda-setting (putting new items onto
the agenda), agenda-structuring (putting vary-
ing emphases on items already on the agenda)
and agenda-exclusion (keeping items off the
agenda). The recent introduction of programmes
spanning several presidencies has reduced any
individual presidency’s agenda-setting and
agenda-exclusion powers but still provides op-
portunities in terms of agenda-structuring. This
may entail scheduling more meetings than usual
in a particular policy area, convening informal
meetings to discuss a particular subject or de-
voting more time in scheduled meetings to the
discussion of the issue in question. The Austri-
ans were accused of using their presidency in
the first half of 2006 as a ‘bully pulpit’ in the
heated debate then raging about genetically
modified organisms (GMOs). Long-standing
opponents of GMOs, the Austrians scheduled a
public debate on the issue at the Environment
Council they chaired in March and convened a
special conference on GMOs in Vienna in April,
despite the fact that no votes were scheduled to
be taken in the Council on the approval of new
GM varieties under the Austrian presidency
(Pollack/Shaffer forthcoming).
In the areas of the CFSP and the associated
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),
the presidency has, since 1999, had to share its
power to set political priorities with the High
Representative, Javier Solana, and with the
newly-formed military bodies. The Council Sec-
retariat, too, has taken on new operational tasks
in these fields, and there is some evidence of
disquiet on the part of some member states about
this development (interview with Council Sec-
retariat official, January 2006).
2.3. Mediation
Having established its priorities, the Coun-
cil must proceed by means of collective deci-
sion-making to put them into effect, whether
through legislation (now largely adopted jointly
with the EP), cooperation or other means. It was
to be expected that agreement would often prove
difficult, particularly once the number of par-
ticipants began to increase and the process of
integration began to widen and deepen. The
original idea was that the High Authority (Com-
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mission) would mediate between the differing
policy preferences and interests bound to arise
within the Council, and this indeed was what
happened in the early days of the EC. A grow-
ing distrust of the supranational character of the
Commission erupted in the Luxembourg crisis
in the mid-1960s, however, after which the
Council proved less willing to allow the Com-
mission to broker agreement between its mem-
bers. Seriously weakened by the fall-out from
the Luxembourg crisis, the Commission was in
no position to protest.
But differences remained, and the role of
mediator still had to be filled. The presidency
was the obvious choice because of its central
position in Council negotiations. The fact that
it rotated on the basis of strict equality between
all the member states and would therefore not
harbour rigid vested interests only added to its
attractiveness. The underlying assumption was
(and continues to be) that the presidency would
fulfil the role of mediator in a neutral and im-
partial manner, demonstrated by the requirement
that a separate delegation be fielded by the presi-
dency member state at all meetings within the
Council hierarchy (with the exception of the
European Council) to speak on its behalf.
Elgström (2003b) has argued that EU presiden-
cies are seldom neutral and not always impar-
tial and that this is not necessarily a bad thing,
given the presidency’s over-riding responsibil-
ity to drive negotiations within the Council to-
wards agreement.
Until recently, neither successive treaties nor
the Council’s internal rules of procedure alluded
to this function of the presidency, allowing it to
develop informally in line with the wishes of
the member governments. The current version
of the CRPs has broken this trend, detailing (in
Article 20 and Annex V) several ways in which
the presidency can ensure that discussions do
not get blocked and that Council sessions pro-
ceed efficiently. These may include: engaging
in written or oral consultation of the member
states in advance of or during breaks in meet-
ings in order to determine where a possible com-
promise might be found; holding restricted ses-
sions of meetings by limiting the number of per-
sons per delegation allowed to be present in the
meeting room; setting the order in which items
are to be discussed and determining the dura-
tion to be allotted for their discussion; and ask-
ing delegations to present in writing their pro-
posals for amendment of a text under discus-
sion before a given date. The Council Secretariat
is authorised, by means of Article 23 CRPs, to
assist the presidency in seeking solutions.
Over time, therefore, it has become an ac-
cepted and indeed expected part of the presi-
dency’s brief to engage in bilateral or multilat-
eral discussions with the other members of the
Council or European Council in order to search
for possible solutions acceptable to most or all
of the participants, thereby reducing conflict,
breaking deadlock and facilitating agreement.
Given its central position in the negotiations and
the advantage it almost inevitably therefore en-
joys in terms of privileged information, the
‘compromise from the chair’ has become an
important element in Council negotiations. This
is even more true in those areas subject to quali-
fied majority voting, where the possibility of
calling a vote can be an important weapon in
the presidency’s armoury.
The presidency’s mediatory role has been
extended again in recent times by its participa-
tion in trialogues with the Commission and the
European Parliament in the context of the co-
decision procedure, and particularly in the proc-
ess of conciliation. Acting as the Council’s rep-
resentative and spokesman, the presidency en-
gages in negotiations with its counterparts at
various levels in the other institutions, report-
ing back to its Council colleagues on their con-
cerns and preferences. The privileged informa-
tion it gains through these discussions strength-
ens the position of the presidency, giving it a
unique view of the negotiations in the round
rather than from one particular angle.
2.4. Representation
In its dealings with the other institutions and
the outside world, the Council has had to learn
to speak with one voice, and that voice has tra-
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ditionally belonged to the presidency. Originally,
the Council was only required to consult the EP
(then the Common Assembly), which in many
cases meant waiting for the Assembly to deliver
its opinion and then proceeding to do what the
Council had intended doing in any case. Over
the years, however, the stature of the EP has
grown, first with the acquisition of budgetary
powers in the early 1970s, next as a result of its
direct election at the end of that decade, and then
through its attainment of increased legislative
powers by means of the introduction of the co-
operation procedure in 1985 followed by the co-
decision procedure in 1992 and its subsequent
extension.
Consequently the Council is now obliged to
take the EP much more seriously and to invest
much more time than heretofore in speaking to
and negotiating with it. As the official repre-
sentative of and spokesman for the Council, the
presidency must therefore include in its sched-
ule a series of meetings at all levels with repre-
sentatives of the EP. The presidency prime min-
ister and relevant ministers attend EP plenary
sessions and committee meetings, where they
speak and answer questions on behalf of the
Council about its work programme and current
dossiers. In the context of the co-decision pro-
cedure, presidency ministers and officials meet
their counterparts in the EP and the Commis-
sion regularly in so-called trialogues, in order
to keep dossiers moving up and down the Coun-
cil hierarchy and to improve their chances of
being decided at first or second reading stage in
the co-decision procedure. Dates must also be
set for meetings of the Conciliation Committee,
which is alternately chaired by the EP and the
Council presidency, and in which the latter acts
as the spokesman for the Council.
But it is in its external representational role
that the presidency has seen the greatest degree
of change in its tasks. The establishment of EPC
in the 1970s thrust the presidency into the inter-
national limelight because of the explicit
sidelining of the Commission. The London re-
port of 1981 and the Stuttgart Solemn Declara-
tion of 1983 attributed a growing number of
representational tasks to the presidency
(Westlake/Galloway 2004, 330-2), and these
were increased with the establishment of the
CFSP in the early 1990s. More recently, the
presidency’s representational role has been
somewhat eclipsed as a result of the appoint-
ment of the High Representative (HR) for the
CFSP at the end of the 1990s, and the decision
to change the composition of the troika (from
the current, preceding and succeeding presiden-
cies to the current Council president, the HR
for the CFSP and the Commissioner for Exter-
nal Relations) has also diluted somewhat the
presidency’s powers in this area.
External policy includes not only foreign and
security policy but also trade and overseas de-
velopment. In this context, the presidency regu-
larly meets the representatives of third countries
and international organisations in a variety of
forums, including Association, Cooperation and
Partnership Councils, and summits and minis-
terial meetings with major partners. In some of
these, it acts as part of the troika, while in oth-
ers it shares representational responsibility with




The presidency’s functions, as we have seen,
are many and varied, making the office a de-
manding and somewhat daunting undertaking,
particularly for smaller member states. But if
things go well, the six months in office can also
be an exhilarating and ultimately rewarding ex-
perience for those directly involved, who get to
play a much more central role than usual in the
process of European integration. Paying atten-
tion to some of the basic organisational aspects
of the Council presidency can be an important
determinant as to whether a member state will
ultimately be judged to have conducted a ‘good’
or ‘bad’ presidency by its peers. Here we look
briefly at four organisational elements of the
presidency: rotation and seating, the role of the
permanent representation, the input of the Coun-
cil Secretariat and information and publicity.
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3.1. Rotation and seating
The rotating mechanism of the Council
presidency is based on the notion of strict equal-
ity between the member states. No matter what
its size, gross domestic product or political pro-
file, each member state takes its scheduled turn
at the helm of the Council for a set period of six
months. How is the order of rotation deter-
mined? The original system, agreed in 1951 for
the Special Council of the ECSC and applied
thereafter to the other European Communities,
was simple: it listed the member states in alpha-
betical order according to the name of their
member state in the official language(s) of that
country. Thus, Belgie/Belgique was followed by
Deutschland, France, Italia, Luxembourg and
Nederland, at which stage Belgium took over
again. This system had the merit of coping eas-
ily with the accession of new member states,
who simply took their alphabetical place on the
list. As the EC/EU gained in size and complex-
ity, however, successive enlargements became
the occasion for changing the system again, in
response to certain inherent defects that had
manifested themselves over the years.
In 1986, an alternating rotation system was
introduced in order to ensure that each of the
member states would take turns presiding in the
busy second half of the year, which effectively
only lasts for four months because of the sum-
mer break. A decade later, the Act of Accession
for Austria, Finland and Sweden introduced a
completely different order of rotation designed
to ensure that the troika (the coordinating
mechanism for the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy, bringing together the current, pre-
ceding and succeeding presidencies) would al-
ways include at least one larger member state
and that neutral member states would always
be grouped with non-neutral ones. The large-
scale enlargement of 2004, followed by the ac-
cession of Bulgaria and Romania in January
2007, necessitated yet another re-working of the
order of rotation, designed to reflect a balance
of geographical situation, economic weight and
‘old’ and ‘new’ members. The order of rotation
is now fixed, by means of a Council decision,
until 2020 - although changes can be made for
duly substantiated reasons, provided all the
member states are in agreement.
Besides determining the exact six months
when a member state takes on the presidency,
the order of rotation affects a number of other
organisational aspects in the life of the Council.
The member state representatives sit around the
negotiating tables at all levels of the Council
hierarchy in the order in which they will accede
to the presidency, moving one space to the left
every six months as another member state takes
over the office of the presidency. The representa-
tive of the preceding presidency sits on the cur-
rent presidency’s left, with the national delegate
of the presidency member state occupying the
position immediately to the right of the presi-
dency. When calling upon national delegates to
speak, the presidency usually moves around the
table from left to right, and may also choose to
use this formula if and when roll-call voting
takes place. In a certain sense, a member state’s
position in the order of rotation is largely irrel-
evant, so long as the underlying principle of
strict equality is maintained, and each member
state is guaranteed an equal share of time at the
forefront of Council activity. In another sense,
however, who holds the presidency before and
after you can have important implications for
coordination and continuity, and can have long-
term consequences not only for the member
states involved but also for the EU as a whole.
3.2. The role of the national permanent
representation
Every member state taking over the Coun-
cil presidency faces a fundamental choice about
the degree of influence to be exercised by the
national permanent representation in Brussels.
The post of permanent representative is, with-
out exception, one of the most senior in the dip-
lomatic systems of each of the member states
and the representations are staffed by highly
qualified officials chosen for their ability and
expertise to represent their member state within
the Council hierarchy. The advantage of – and
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indeed the argument for – letting the Brussels-
based officials in the permanent representation
take the lead both before and during the presi-
dency is that, because of their expertise and lo-
cation, they are well plugged-in to the relevant
Brussels networks and therefore well-informed
and useful guides as to what proposals or out-
comes are likely to be acceptable to the other
members of the Council. Indeed, one seasoned
commentator has suggested that ‘the permanent
representative can make as well as break a presi-
dency, not just in his dealings with his peers,
but in his handling of the home front’ (Ludlow
2005, 3). On the other hand, a certain wariness
of Brussels-based officials ‘going native’ and
the belief that capital-based officials are best
placed to understand ‘the national interest’ un-
derpin the alternative view that presidencies
should be led from the capital, with valuable
input from the permanent representation. In the
event, the final decision is left up to each mem-
ber state.
Whatever the eventual balance between the
capital and the permanent representation in the
definition of policy during the presidency pe-
riod, the premises of the presidency national
permanent representation becomes a hub of ac-
tivity both in the lead-up to the period in office
and during the actual six months when that
member state is in the chair. All are located
within easy distance of the Justus Lipsius build-
ing and are therefore used for planning meet-
ings, briefings, de-briefings, and so on. Their
level of personnel tends to increase by anything
up to 25 per cent in the run-up to and during the
presidency, because of the increased work-load
necessitated by the presidency and the need for
increased representation of the member state in
question.
With technological advances, it is now pos-
sible for officials in Brussels and the capital (and
indeed national embassies around the world) to
link up via video conferences on a daily basis if
necessary, without the need for officials to stir
from their respective places of work. The Danes
were the first to institute this practice during their
presidency in the second half of 2002 (Ludlow
2004, 83-8), and the practice has been adopted
by other presidencies since. This development
is particularly welcome for officials from coun-
tries geographically far away from Brussels, for
whom constant travel would be costly, tiring and
time-consuming.
3.3. The input of the Council Secretariat
The General Secretariat of the Council, to
give it its correct title, began life as a small ad-
ministrative body, owing its existence not to the
founding treaties of the EC but to the Council’s
internal rules of procedure. It has grown stead-
ily in size and influence over the years as a re-
sult of successive extensions in the scope of the
Council’s activity, the creation of the European
Council and enlargement. Changes in the EU’s
decision-making procedures and voting rules
have had a marked effect on its organisation and
powers, which have been recognised retrospec-
tively in treaties and the rules of procedure since
the early 1990s. Similarly, the addition of the
function of mediator (under the guidance of the
presidency) to the roles of the Secretary Gen-
eral has been acknowledged via the Council’s
rules of procedure. At the end of the 1990s, the
Secretary General also took on the additional
role of the High Representative for the CFSP
and a Deputy Secretary General was appointed
in order to oversee the day-to-day running of
the Secretariat.
The Council Secretariat is the servant of the
Council as a whole, but works most closely with
the presidency. As the one stable element in a
constantly shifting institution, the Secretariat is
well-placed to be the institutional memory of
the Council, and therefore a vital resource for
the presidency. Thus, the Secretariat is fre-
quently intimately involved in the initial draft-
ing of the programmes of incoming presiden-
cies. Its officials attend meetings at all levels in
the Council hierarchy to provide administrative
and legal support as well as tactical advice, and
their reports or minutes of these meetings con-
stitute the basic working documents for subse-
quent meetings. Senior officials from the Sec-
retariat also help in the drafting of the presiden-
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cy’s conclusions which form the only official
record of what was said and decided at Euro-
pean Council meetings. The Secretary-General,
in his capacity as the High Representative for
the CFSP, speaks on behalf of the Council in
this policy area, in close cooperation with the
presidency in office.
The Council Secretariat is therefore a valu-
able resource for any incoming presidency, but
particularly for a smaller member state, which
may have no option but to depend heavily on
the Secretariat because of a lack of its own re-
sources. Equally, a new member state exercis-
ing the presidency for the first time will benefit
greatly from the accumulated experience of the
Secretariat in relation to both procedural and
substantive issues. In the final analysis, it is the
presidency itself that decides on the amount of
input it is prepared to accept from the Council
Secretariat, and most insiders would assert that
the systems work best when the presidency and
Council Secretariat work closely together.
3.4. Information and publicity
As its functions have extended over the
years, the office of the presidency has increas-
ingly come to be viewed as a vital part of the
EU’s institutional structure. Consequently every
incoming presidency member state becomes the
target of sometimes exaggerated expectations,
and the object of close and continual scrutiny,
both domestically and internationally. The posi-
tive side of this potentially uncomfortable situ-
ation is that, in addition to being an administra-
tive burden, the six-month presidency term can
also be viewed and approached as an educational
and marketing opportunity in two senses: an
international audience can be apprised of the
attributes and attractions of the host member
state, while its own citizens can be informed
about the operation and policies of the EU.
As a result, a good deal of time, effort and
money is now invested by an incoming presi-
dency not only in the administrative and sub-
stantive aspects of organising meetings and
drawing up agendas, but also in the ‘packag-
ing’ of the presidency as a whole. In 2004, the
presidency was (probably conservatively) esti-
mated to cost a member state in the region of
EUR 60 million (Sie Dhian Ho/Van Keulen
2004) and it is reasonable to assume that the
cost has gone up rather than down in the in-
terim. This is a considerable investment but it is
presumably justified in a number of ways: hold-
ing the presidency is obligatory, not optional; it
is important in terms of European integration to
do it well; and it is worth doing it well because
of the reflected glory and other positive side-
effects which thereby accrue to the member state
in question.
The presidency today is viewed in some
senses as a branding exercise, an opportunity to
put a national spin on a rotating office. Here we
will look briefly at two results of this trend: the
presidency logo and slogan, and the presidency
website.
3.4.1. The presidency logo and slogan
Since the late 1980s, when increased trans-
parency became a real preoccupation in the
Council, every presidency has put forward its
own logo, which has adorned its website, con-
ference venues, backdrops, banners, stationery,
badges, flags, posters, gifts – even doormats, in
the case of the 2007 German presidency! The
choice of the logo is entirely up to the member
state itself and many put it out to competitive
tender. The aim is to produce a visual image
that will be easily recognised and remembered,
while in some way encapsulating the national
identity of the presidency member state and at-
testing to the European aspect of the office of
the presidency. Thus the presidency logo often
incorporates the member state’s national colours
and the presidency website address, and may
include such iconographic images as twelve
yellow stars in the design. Some previous presi-
dency logos can be viewed on former presidency
websites, still accessible via a link from the main
Council website.
Presidency slogans are a more recent phe-
nomenon and have yet to prove as popular as
presidency logos. Some recent examples are:
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Europe into the new Millennium (the Finnish
presidency in the first half of 1999); Europeans
Working Together (the Irish presidency in the
first half of 2004); and Europe – Succeeding
Together (the German presidency in the first half
of 2007).
3.4.2. The presidency website
The presidency website first made its appear-
ance towards the end of the 1990s and quickly
proved an indispensable tool in the transmis-
sion of information from the presidency to the
general public. They are designed and main-
tained by the presidency itself and, like the logo,
may encapsulate something of the national char-
acteristics of the member state in question. Here
can be found the presidency’s programme, im-
portant speeches made by leading presidency
figures, the calendar of scheduled meetings,
general information about the office of the presi-
dency, tourist and cultural information about the
presidency member state, photo archives and the
conclusions of meetings of the European Coun-
cil. Some websites contain a ‘who’s who’ of the
key presidency figures, while others may include
an educational quiz about the EU. Most are
available in at least three languages. All become
inactive (though some remain accessible) as of
midnight of the last day of the six-month term
in office, as the presidency mantle is handed on
to the next member state on the list with a mix-
ture that is probably made up of one third regret
and two-thirds relief!
4. Conclusions
The presidency started off in the 1950s as
an administrative chore to be shared on the ba-
sis of strict equality among the member states
of the then European Communities. Over time,
its functions became highly developed and its
role increased in importance because of the fol-
lowing factors:
– a political vacuum left by a Commission
weakened by the Luxembourg crisis and its
aftermath;
– the establishment and subsequent institution-
alisation of the European Council;
– the increased scope and need for mediation
resulting from the introduction of majority
voting rules;
– the introduction of new policy areas not sub-
ject to the so-called ‘Community method’;
– enlargement, resulting in greater numbers
and increased complexity;
– new transparency rules which led to height-
ened interest in the Council and how it op-
erates.
As member states began to recognise the
potential power of the chair, the period of presi-
dential office came to be viewed as an opportu-
nity for promoting national interests, and a cer-
tain amount of incoherence and lack of conti-
nuity between presidencies became apparent. In
order to rectify this potential weakness, new
constraints have been imposed on incoming
presidencies. These have been designed to avert
the potential danger of weak presidencies, but
equally to guard against the possibility of an
overly strong presidency attempting to impose
its will on its colleagues against their wishes.
These constraints include greater programming,
an increased role for the Council Secretariat and
the introduction of an embryonic form of team
presidencies. In some senses, the office of the
presidency today has reverted to being a proce-
dural chore, the fundamental difference being
that the office now carries with it large amounts
of political prestige because of the Council’s
central position in virtually every area of EU
activity. The preoccupation of recent presiden-
cies with issues of publicity and information may
therefore be an attempt on their part to help the
public to distinguish one presidency from an-
other.
NOTES
1 The Luxembourg crisis of 1965-66 arose out of three
distinct but linked disagreements. One was between
the Commission and the member governments (in
particular France) over three key proposals put for-
ward by the Commission on the financing of the
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Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the introduc-
tion of the Community’s own resources and the ex-
tending of the budgetary powers of the European
Parliament. The second disagreement was between
France and its colleagues in the Council over the
planned movement in January 1966 to qualified
majority voting (QMV) for a significant range of
issues in the Council. The third disagreement was a
more general one between the Council and the Com-
mission, having to do with their respective status.
Finding itself isolated, France decided to follow an
‘empty chair’ policy by boycotting Council meet-
ings for several months, thereby preventing deci-
sions being taken by the Council. The crisis was
eventually resolved by means of the Luxembourg
Compromise, an informal agreement that decisions
subject to QMV could be delayed until unanimous
agreement had been reached in the Council (in ef-
fect introducing a national veto on such issues). The
Commission was also required to consult with the
member states before introducing new proposals, a
stipulation which eroded its right of initiative. The
Luxembourg Compromise was rarely invoked ex-
plicitly, but because of its existence, the practice of
searching for consensus in the Council even when
QMV was the decision rule became ingrained. For
a comprehensive account of the origins, handling
and implications of the crisis, see the volume by
Palayret et al. (2006).
2 Internet: www.consilium.europa.eu.
3 It should be noted, however, that a presidency has
the right to refuse to allow the transmission of the
ministers’ deliberations for duly substantiated rea-
sons. This was the case in October 2003, when the
Italian presidency controversially decided not to al-
low the broadcasting of a ministerial discussion on
the investment services directive ‘because of the
sensitivity of the issue’ (Financial Times, 9/10/2003).
4 Internet: www.consilium.europa.eu/videostreaming.
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